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Network strategies for the 
new economy
In this paper we argue that the pace and scale of
development in the information and communication
technology industries (ICT) has had and continues
to have major effects on the industry economics and
competitive dynamics generally. We maintain that
the size of changes in demand and supply conditions
is forcing companies to make significant changes in
the way they conceive and implement their strate-
gies. We decompose the ICT industries into four
levels, technology standards, supply chains, physical
platforms, and consumer networks. The nature of
these technologies and their cost characteristics cou-
pled with higher degrees of knowledge specialisation
is impelling companies to radical revisions of their
attitudes towards cooperation and co-evolution with
suppliers and customers. Where interdependencies
between customers are particularly strong, we antic-
ipate the possibility of winner-takes-all strategies. In
these circumstances industry risks become very high
and there will be significant consequences for com-
petitive markets.
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The need for new strategic perspectives
The new information and communication technolo-
gies of the last decade are fundamentally transforming
the operating methods of most manufacturing and
service companies and are provoking wholesale re-
appraisal of the nature of support functions. These
technologies have become institutionalised in the
new ICT (information and communications technol-
ogy) industry across the world and are now having an
equally revolutionary effect on corporate strategy.
Executives are rethinking the strategic fundamentals
of business practices not just in technology and com-
munications industries but also across the entire
spectrum of industries. 
Many of the component parts of this new ICT
industry, such as telecommunications, the Internet,
computing and software, are shaping significant parts
of the corporate environment into a new ‘network
economy’. The essence of networks is the existence
of multiple nodes, the interconnectivity between
them, and the cooperative (as opposed to competi-
tive) behaviour of the nodes. Thus, networks have
increasing returns to scale characteristics. The
dynamics of corporations and the new information
economy will increasingly reflect these increasing
returns to scale, and therefore understanding how
such networks work is the key to developing a new
set of strategies in this new information-based corpo-
rate landscape (Kelly, 1998). 
The ‘old world’ was driven by economies of scale
and scope where the benefits of size are moderated by
eventual diminishing returns. The ‘new world’,
spawned by information and communications tech-
nology, is not moderated by the normally powerful
moderating influence of diminishing returns.
Network effects, also known as network externali-
ties, can result in ‘winner-takes-all’ phenomena (for
example, the Wintel standard for PCs) and therefore
result in new industry dynamics and new sets of cor-
porate responses. (For a discussion of network effects
see McGee and Sammut-Bonnici, 2002.)
The burgeoning growth and influence of the new
ICT industry is making it possible for more individu-
als, corporations and companies to reap the benefits
of the information economy. The Internet has pro-
vided a free infrastructure for this rapid exchange of
information and is creating new distribution oppor-
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tunities in regional and global economies. The
development of the ‘self-organising’ web of new
economy industries is affecting all elements of trade
and brings commercial gains to regional and global
economies. The Digital Planet 2002 report indi-
cates the scale of this effect. At the regional level,
Eastern Europe’s spending grew faster in 2001 than
the North America, Latin America, Middle East
and Africa regions combined. Mature economies
such as the US will become less dominant, as
China, Poland and a host of other developing coun-
tries play an increasing role. At a more micro level,
information industries are giving rise to geographic
hot-spots of commercial activity, created from eco-
nomic webs, corporate clusters, and commercial
ecosystems. California’s Silicon Valley, Taiwan and
Tokyo are such examples. Local concentration of
ICT activity may develop spontaneously or can be
created by governments and regional planners.
Malaysia is developing two of the world’s first ‘smart
cities’: Putrajaya, the new seat of government pro-
viding e-government facilities, and Cyberjaya, a
city for multimedia industries, R&D centres, a mul-
timedia university and operational headquarters of
multinationals wishing to direct their trading activ-
ities using information technology. The underlying
feature of smart cities is the high level of ICT infra-
structure, on which the whole city is developed.
Another example of regional growth due to the
information economy is northern Virginia, USA.
Its economy has boomed with the explosion of
Internet and telecommunication companies.
America Online, which set up in northern Virginia
in 1985, employs over 13 000 people, and generates
over $1.5 billion in online revenues. The presence
of a number of multinational companies such as
AOL, UUNet and Worldcom MCI in the area
attracts competitors as well as vendors through the
normal multiplier effects. ICT industries have well-
documented, substantial effects on the local,
regional and global economies through the multi-
plier effect. 
The extent to which the ICT industry and
associated network industries have proliferated in
the economy is a recent phenomenon. However,
network effects have been recognised for some
time since the onset of industrialisation but partic-
ularly with the advent of the first infrastructure
industries (especially railroads) in Victorian times.
Literature on network externalities dates back
almost a century to the works of Young (1913),
Knight (1924), and Ellis and Fellner (1943).
Contemporary research on networks tends to be
econometric in nature (Shy, 2000) and charts
industry evolution over time in a series of snap-
shots. We adopt Shapiro and Varian’s (1999)
strategic perspective on network industries and
develop a strategic framework that transcends ICT
and non-ICT companies. We start this journey by
analysing the structure of network industries and
looking at the dynamics endemic in each level
within that structure. 
Technology and network industry
structure
Much of the popular discussion of technology and
its effects makes powerful but general claims for the
effect of technology but is less than clear about the
underlying mechanisms. We observe four nested
levels of infrastructure within network industries.
Each of these levels has its own economic dynamics
and each makes a contribution to the overall net-
work (increasing returns characteristic). These
levels are (i) technology standards, (ii) the supply
chain driven by such standards, (iii) the physical
platforms that are the output of the supply chains
and are the basis from which the company delivers
its product (e.g. the digital TV, the decoder, the
satellite system, and the telephone lines that are the
platform from which Sky TV delivers its pro-
grammes), and (iv) the consumer network (Figure
1). The economic characteristics of the first three
levels are the prevalence of fixed costs and joint
products coupled within economies of scale.
Networks of interacting and interdependent cus-
tomers provide the increasing returns characteristic
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FIGURE 1: Strategic levels of network industries.
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of networks. Then the whole can have such power-
ful positive feedback characteristics that the winner
might be able to take all.
Each level displays distinctive economic charac-
teristics of significance. Technology standards can
be achieved either by rule or by emergence and in
the latter case early mover advantages are impor-
tant. The economics of modularity and the
specialisation of knowledge shape the structure of
supply chains. Physical platforms are a combination
of standards and components in which modularity
and the economics of substitution also play a signif-
icant role. Consumer networks, of course, require
positive feedback effects for their full power to be
gained. We use the mobile telecommunications
business as a running example to show how these
technological dimensions and strategy interact. 
Technology and standards
The significance of the economics of information is
attributed to two key factors: the continuing reduc-
tion in cost of information technology hardware
products and the scale impact of global standards.
Gordon Moore, founder of Intel Corporation, creat-
ed a corporate empire on his eponymous Moore’s
law, which states that every year and a half process-
ing power doubles while costs hold constant.
Moore’s foresight proved prophetic. He has been
proved right and it appears that his law will hold for
the foreseeable future. Computer memory, storage
capacity and telecommunications bandwidth are all
going through a similar pattern of cost reduction.
This makes it very affordable for individuals and
small businesses to be equipped with the electronic
means to conduct commerce and transfer informa-
tion as fast and freely as large corporations can.
Hence, the demand for the products of the ICT
industries continues to grow (in spite of the feast
and famine evident in the telecommunications
industry reminiscent of the fragility of corporate
structures during the railway boom of the 1840s).
Network products rely on production technolo-
gy as well as the prevailing operating technology
standards for their respective industries. For exam-
ple, automated teller machines across the world
must work on an agreed standard to ensure cus-
tomers can use one card in different countries. A
technology standard becomes an important enabler
to create wide reach and to capture a wide network
of subscribers. With the globalisation of commerce,
national and regional boundaries blur and the need
for international standards becomes more promi-
nent. 
A new standard can be registered with organisa-
tions such as the British Standards Institute, the
American National Standards Institute or the
International Standards Organisation. But the
process to determine the prevailing standard does
not stop there. The path to achieving a de facto
standard depends on three modes of selection
strategies: market-based selection, negotiated selec-
tion and a hybrid selection process where both
market competition and negotiation play a signifi-
cant role. 
Market-based standard selection is reminiscent of
standards wars such as that between VHS and
Betamax. In this case consumers decided on the
dominance of the VHS standard. The marketing
strategies of firms are key to which firm and stan-
dard is most likely to win. It is argued that VHS
gained a decisive advantage from a strategy of wider
distribution channels and a range of complemen-
tary products (Hollywood films in tape) as well as
longer recording time than Betamax, in spite of
other more advanced features available only on
Betamax.
Negotiated standardisation is becoming more
widespread. Organisations that determine prevail-
ing standards are emerging to reduce the cost and
the uncertainty associated with adopting new stan-
dards. Negotiated standard setting guarantees the
smooth interchange of information, technical com-
ponents and services along different networks. The
telecommunications industry was able to keep up
with the speed of technological development by
opening up the negotiation process to market play-
ers (David and Steinmueller, 1994; David and
Shurmer, 1996). Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM),
the current mobile technology in Europe, is an asso-
ciation of 600 network operators and suppliers of
the mobile phone industry. The Universal Mobile
Telecommunication System (UMTS) Forum is a
similar association, developed to speed convergence
between telecommunications, IT, media and con-
tent suppliers for the 3G industry. As with GSM,
the name of the UMTS association is synonymous
with the name for the industry technology standard. 
The Internet has a different history of standard-
isation to telecommunications. Standards were
completely open and established within the
research communities of universities. As the
Internet has become a commodity for the domestic
and the commercial communities, other players are
increasingly influencing its evolution. 
Hybrid standard setting emerges as private firms
adopt strategies to undercut collaborative decisions
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taken in negotiated standardisation. They intro-
duce new products, which initiate unprecedented
developments, but also create incompatibilities,
lock-in effects, and pockets of market power.
Internet telephony is a typical example, where com-
panies, standards organisations, and governments
create a hybrid standard setting environment
(Vercoulen and van Wegberg, 1998). 
Standards organisations are playing an increas-
ingly important role in the strategy for versioning
standards. The GSM Association is guiding the evo-
lution of the mobile industry through a family of
wireless technology standards from today’s standard
through to GPRS (general packet radio service),
EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution)
and 3GSM. Each subsequent standard offers a high-
er level of service. GPRS provides open Internet.
EDGE facilitates faster data streaming, and 3GSM
will provide video streaming. The network of com-
panies supporting the technologies will go through
grades of service levels, in order to phase out older
standards and introduce new ones (Figure 2). At
the end of the life span of a standard the technolo-
gy platform is decommissioned, with the exception
of equipment and software that is forward compati-
ble with the next generation of standards. 
Software standards follow a similar versioning
strategy. Microsoft publishes the ‘Windows Desktop
Product Lifecycle Guidelines’ to provide advanced
notice of changes in product availability and sup-
port. Microsoft makes Windows licences available
for purchase for a minimum of five years and pro-
vides assisted support for a further four years. The
guidelines are important so that companies can
plan their investment through software upgrades of
Windows 98, NT, 2000, ME, and the latest version
of Windows XP. 
Switching costs are minimised when standards are
designed to evolve from one another. The introduc-
tion of revolutionary standards, however, is costly.
The pay-off is superior performance against the
high cost of switching standards. The telling exam-
ple is the price paid by mobile telephone operators
to switch to third generation technology. Mobile
spectrum auctions earned European governments
£200 billion, with Britain and Germany raising
£22.5 and £60 billion, respectively. The mobile
operators had to bid – to renounce third generation
spectrum was to sign their own death warrant (but
did they have to pay so much?). The outcome of
these auctions left mobile operators no option but
to increase debt to survive. The result was the
depletion of cash flow, a delay in third generation
launches and uncertainty in the stock markets, all
of which became the more significant as the market
faltered and then stopped dead.
Supply chain
In the last twenty years, the structure of the infor-
mation economy has evolved through the
interaction of three factors: the increase in compu-
tational capacity for data mining; the growth of
telecommunication networks both fixed and
mobile; and the explosion of information sharing
via the Internet. 
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These new information technologies created
opportunities for all industries, including network
industries, to take advantage of new ways of manag-
ing supply chains. How to integrate company
functions became the key concern and Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems provided the
solution. Integration of the elements of the supply
chain was seen as a move to dilute the boundaries of
the rigid corporate departmental structures that
were restricting business growth. The ERP era was
the first wave of change in supply chain manage-
ment. Deconstruction policies soon followed. Based
on the example set by the automotive industry,
many companies split their business processes and
pushed some of them out to suppliers. Companies
would retain the processes central to their strategic
priorities and outsource the remainder. The ele-
ments of the supply chain would then be controlled
through proprietary resources, which are difficult to
replicate, such as a strong brand identity. MMO2,
the UK mobile network provider that has faced
upheaval in the past year, is deconstructing its value
chain as a means of strengthening its position
(Pesola, 2002). The company will move all its IT
systems, including such functions as customer care,
e-payments and billing, to IBM. The outsourcing
agreement covers ten years and is worth £50 million
in its first year. MMO2’s tactics are an interesting
pointer to how the European mobile industry is
changing its operating model and emulating the US
model. 
With the outsourcing of functions and the need
for specialist knowledge in handling electronic
transactions, the number of organisations involved
in the supply chain is increasing. As a result of inte-
gration and deconstruction, suppliers are
developing modular structures with Lego-like snap-
together interconnectivity. The complexity of the
new supply chain structure is becoming akin to a
business ecosystem of networked cooperation,
rather than the traditional chain of competing sup-
pliers, manufacturers and distributors. 
Figure 3 depicts the modular structure of the ICT
industries, which constitute the new information
economy. The structure is built on layers of commu-
nication network companies, hardware and software
manufacturers, Internet service providers, e-com-
merce transaction companies, and media and content
companies, and the myriad of service companies.
The network infrastructure suppliers are compa-
nies such as Alcatel, Nortel Networks, Motorola,
and Ericsson that provide communications net-
working equipment. Intel and 3Com form a sub set
of companies in this category, which supply inter-
facing hardware and software. 
The network operators provide the basis of the
exchange of information between companies and
their customers. The medium they operate could be
based on satellite, telephone, mobile, television or
area networks. British Telecom, AT&T, Vodafone,
T-Mobile offer landline and mobile telecommuni-
cations networks. The operation of these companies
is interconnected with other companies. For exam-
ple, Vodafone uses BT’s network. Credit card
companies use Vodafone’s mobile network for off-
site credit verification. Vodafone has sold fixed line
telephone services from Energis and Racal Telecom
networks. The interoperability of different telecom
networks has become a complex business operation.
British Telecom set up BT to develop and manage
such relationships. BT Wholesale sells its fixed net-
work product to independent service providers:
businesses who wish to provide telecom services to
end consumers without owning their own networks.
The independent service provider purchases the
network facility from BT and other network opera-
tors, adding their own value and service brand.
Satellite networks provide the infrastructure for
long distance television, telephony and data inter-
change transmission. SES GLOBAL, Gilat Satellite
Networks and Alcatel Space/SkyBridge have
formed a €200 million joint venture to provide
two-way satellite broadband services in corporate
and home office markets across Europe. The new
company plans to cater for the growing demand for
broadband communications services in Europe via
advanced VSAT satellite technology. 
Digital television networks operate on a host of
platforms such as satellite, copper or optic fibre
cable. Interactive television has opened a host of
business opportunities for retailing. The use of two-
way cable networks, or a return medium via a
normal telephone line, is changing the way con-
sumers use and respond to television content. The
business model for this service implies a new form of
supply chain, for a new form of retailing. 
Internet service providers (ISPs) are part of a com-
plex web that provides the supply chain of
information to the Internet user. ISPs such as AOL
and Fastnet convey Internet content over the infra-
structure of the telecommunication companies. At
the back-end of the supply web, ISPs receive web
pages from various organisations. The owners of the
web pages would be the media and content suppli-
ers, or in many cases, they may have purchased the
services of the media and content suppliers to create
EUROPEAN BUSINESS JOURNAL 178
EBJ 14(4)_crc  2/12/02  2:13 PM  Page 178
their web presence. At the front-end where the sup-
ply web touches the customer, ISPs have to
collaborate or to conform to consumer interface
manufacturers, which in the Internet scenario
would be computer suppliers. The supply web for
Internet is due for another major revolution with
third generation (3G) mobile communication,
which carries high speed Internet and video stream-
ing. The 3G telephone, which will become the new
customer interface, would dictate a change in
Internet transmission management and the nature
of media content, all the way down the supply
chain. 
The supply chain in the information economy
shown in Figure 3 takes the form of a web-like net-
work where each member may have to collaborate
with all the other members. Inter-collaboration is
necessary partly because of software and hardware
compatibility. An example of this web-like struc-
ture is the relationship between e-transaction
companies, ISPs and media content providers and
the companies that own the web pages. The four
NETWORK STRATEGIES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 179
FIGURE 3: The modular infrastructure of the ICT economy.
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types of organisation have to ensure the compatibil-
ity of their services across the supply network. 
The infrastructure of the information economy
does not look like a normal, traditional and com-
petitive supply chain in the ‘old’ industrial
economy. Telephony and the Internet have made it
possible for corporations to have commercial part-
nerships with many more companies. The notion of
‘information is power’ is turned on its head. As
more companies have access to more information
through communication, power is dissipated to
more members in the supply chain. The increase in
information exchange has become the overriding
equaliser of power throughout the supply networks. 
The basis of the new economy is the increase in
connectivity among the various players in the chain.
The connectivity level itself is rapidly evolving as
communication and computational technologies
become faster. The whole supply network is in a state
of flux. Flexibility and adaptability have become
essential strategic stances. Faster connectivity within
the supply chain not only implies more interconnec-
tions between companies. It creates more volatile
and replaceable interrelationships. 
The concept of replaceable interrelationships
has come about because companies are becoming
‘isomorphic’ or similar in nature. DiMaggio and
Powell (1983, p. 149), drawing from Hawley
(1968), define isomorphism as ‘a constraining
process that forces one unit in a population to
resemble other units that face the same set of envi-
ronmental conditions’. With the standardisation of
technology, products are becoming more similar in
design and quality. With the standardisation of
internal operations, through materials resource
planning (MRP), enterprise resource planning
(ERP) and electronic customer relationship man-
agement (eCRM), the service levels of competing
companies are becoming similar in content and in
construction. The implication is that suppliers are
easily replaced with similar companies that have
similar products and similar delivery attributes. 
The information economy is creating a web of
companies that have lower barriers of entry, but
fewer safety nets for retaining business. The older,
hierarchical value chains of the industrial economy
reinforced exclusivity whilst the information econ-
omy is more inclusive. 
The rise of co-evolution and cooperation
The new web-like value chain gives rise to a ‘self-
organising’ system. In nature flocking is a form of
self-organisation. The formation of flocking birds is
a self-organising form of collaboration with simple
goals of direction and velocity. Kevin Kelly (1998)
gives a general overview of the future implications
of adaptation. Companies organise and adapt their
relationships with vendors and distributors. They
select and substitute their partners in the value
chain according to changes in the consumer mar-
ket. Vendors and distributors in turn adapt to new
market scenarios. For example, a wave of collabora-
tive buying (when competitors join forces for
purchasing) is counteracted by a wave of collabora-
tive vending from vendors. The system eventually
normalises the balance of power. 
The ‘self-organising’ aspect in the information
economy leads to the concept of ‘co-evolution’.
Evolving to meet the needs of other members in the
value chain is becoming a more effective strategy
than satisfying the company’s own needs. Adapting
to meet other companies’ need leads to more busi-
ness. Riding the new wave of co-evolution,
companies are avoiding costly races against each
other, in favour of a strategy of joining forces to gain
more customers. We are observing this effect in
NEC and Siemens, who have joined forces to sup-
ply the networks for Hutchison 3G, which will be a
key network provider for third generation telecom-
munications in Europe. 
Co-evolution and collaboration are even more
relevant in industries where network externalities
are a vital part of corporate success. The more 
customers join a network, such as a telecommunica-
tions service, the higher is the incentive for other
customers to join. This effect is causing companies
to collaborate on issues of compatibility. With 3G
mobile phones on the horizon for Europe and the
US, the standards war for a mobile Internet operat-
ing system has begun. Microsoft, Linux, Symbian
and Openwave are in the race to establish a widely
accepted standard. This is an example of old style
competition, but it has caused a wave of co-evolu-
tion in another layer of competitors. The issue of
standards has motivated Nokia and Siemens,
Europe’s largest manufacturers of mobile phones, to
collaborate. They have teamed up to accelerate the
introduction of third generation mobile services.
The collaboration of two companies will guarantee
that Nokia and Siemens handsets can communicate
with each other seamlessly. In this way the two com-
panies, which have a combined global market share
of 45%, will benefit from network externalities and
the positive feedback generated from providing a
larger compatible technology network. Nokia and
Siemens anticipate that other equipment vendors
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will link up with them to minimise industry frag-
mentation.
Physical platforms
Physical platforms are the technical networks sup-
porting telephones, satellites, digital TV and local
area networks. Globalstar is an example of a 
physical platform. Globalstar provides mobile
telecommunications using low earth orbiting
(LEO) satellites. Its telephones look like mobile or
fixed phones with the difference that they can oper-
ate in areas outside normal reach. The satellite
platform picks up signals from the Earth’s surface,
and relays to the terrestrial gateway. Gateways dis-
tribute the calls to existing fixed and mobile
networks. Terrestrial gateways are vital to integrate
the company’s services with existing local telepho-
ny networks. The size of a physical network does
not guarantee success. Iridium had a larger physical
platform of satellites than Globalstar, but faced
marketing related difficulties at start-up. When it
launched in 1998 it targeted the consumer users,
who rejected the service because of its cost and
bulky first generation phones. Iridium filed for
bankruptcy in 2001 and planned to decommission
its satellite platform. It was purchased by a consor-
tium, which paid $25 million for the inactive
satellite system, which cost $5 billion when it was
built in 1998. Iridium has recuperated most of its
losses by changing its marketing segmentation strat-
egy. Its current major user is the US Department of
Defense in line with its sales strategy to service large
industrial users in remote locations (Weiss, 2001).
Managing interoperability
Physical platforms in the telecommunications
industry are typically open platforms (like Wintel is
for PCs). It is the interconnectivity with other tele-
com networks that adds value and creates network
externalities. Open platforms have stipulated proto-
cols, which are implemented by a large user base as
in the case of IBM clones. Closed platforms or pro-
prietary platforms make it difficult for others to
interact properly with those systems. Microsoft soft-
ware and Apple computers are examples of closed
platforms.
Open networks require interconnections and
compatibility with surrounding networks.
Telecommunications platforms have had to cope
with the complexity of interoperability among dif-
ferent systems, as well as the agility required to shift
rapidly to newer standards. The dynamics of com-
plexity and agility used to be opposing forces
(Vercoulen and Wegberg, 1998). A complex inter-
connected physical platform tends to develop
slowly. Railway systems and the telecom networks in
many countries show this inertia. Communications
and technology firms progressively created a solu-
tion to these opposing dynamics of development.
As in the supply chain case discussed earlier, com-
panies divided their platform structure into separate
modules, each with some degree of autonomy
(Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Garud et al., 1995).
Each module is designed with the flexibility for
rapid change, such as the shift from ETACS
(Extended Total Access Communication System)
to GSM. The complexity feature is retained because
each module is interoperable with other modules to
form a web-like complex system. The modules are
therefore interdependent through the nodes, or
joints between the modules. Interoperability
between modules creates value for the user, as we
observe in the ability to call overseas on a mobile
telephone. Roaming of mobile telephones from
country to country is another example.
Interoperability exists between platforms of differ-
ent network providers in the same country, or
different platforms in different countries. 
Physical platforms have evolved from the simple
structures such as the older regional railway system,
to a complex structure of interconnected sub-plat-
forms. For this reason, the joints between the
sub-networks become the strength of the whole
structure, or conversely it could be its Achilles heel.
It is therefore vital to define standards for joints.
The standards that govern how a system and its
modules interact are called the network’s architec-
ture (Morris and Ferguson, 1993).
Henderson and Clark (1990) review two kinds of
dynamic processes in modular systems: modular
innovation and architectural innovation. The for-
mer type retains the architecture of the network
including its joints, but modifies the modules. By
preserving the basic architecture of a system, net-
work providers offer users enough compatibility to
shift from one product generation to the next. The
changes occur in the innovations and improvements
of the modular components. They are fitted into the
system when required, and will be removed when
obsolete. The result is a hybrid dynamic of change
that preserved the platform’s architecture, whilst
creating innovations within the module structure. A
series of minor incremental modular changes can
lead to an overall network platform that is radically
new (Vercoulen and Wegberg, 1998).
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In architectural innovation, the modules are
largely unchanged, but the architecture that con-
nects them (the jointing system) is changed
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). The speed of inno-
vation can be fast, since a key part of the system, the
modular structure, is retained. New joints between
these modules are installed. In some cases, adopting
new standards and installing some new modules
that embody these standards creates an architectur-
al innovation. The development of the Internet in
the late 1990s is an example of an architectural
innovation in a network platform. The main propo-
nents of the Internet evolution are standard setting
bodies such as the World Wide Web consortium
and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(Vercoulen and Wegberg, 1998). 
Building alliances 
The reach of a technical platform determines the
size of the consumer base. For this reason, compa-
nies are building alliances to gain the rewards of
positive feedback. Apple and Microsoft have col-
laborated to create a version of Office that operates
on an Apple computer. The effect is to allow the
Apple computer platform to overlap with the
Microsoft Office platform. In the mobile industry,
competing telephone manufacturers are clamouring
to create a communications platform with a com-
mon operating system. Ericsson and Nokia use the
Symbian operating system on their third generation
mobile phones. Panasonic and Motorola are plan-
ning to introduce telephones with a joint software
platform. Symbian will receive a total of $17.95
million in funding from Nokia Corp., Motorola
Inc., Panasonic, Sony Ericsson and Psion, to sup-
port its development (Evers, 2002). 
The Ethernet is an earlier example of alliance
formation intended to increase the size of a physical
platform. In 1973 Metcalfe and Boggs invented
Ethernet, the local area networking (LAN) tech-
nology that acts as a means to send vast amounts of
data at high speed to the laser printers that Xerox
was designing. Interestingly, the Ethernet came
before the PC, yet it was to create a breakthrough in
computer networking that would eventually tie
together over fifty million PCs worldwide. The
Ethernet quickly attracted Digital and Intel’s inter-
est to adopt the communication platform. Metcalfe
had moved on to form 3Com but remained the key
player in the discussions between Xerox, Digital
and Intel. The DI3X group was formed named after
the first letter of the company names. The alliance
lobbied for Ethernet to become a standard approved
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE). Xerox agreed to license Ethernet
to all users at a nominal fee of one thousand dollars.
It realised that it would have to provide an open
standard to get computer manufacturers to take on
Ethernet as an interface to their printers. The
strength of Ethernet was that it allowed PCs and
workstations from different manufacturers to com-
municate by using an agreed standard, hence
increasing the size of its physical platform and
therefore its reach.
Consumer networks
The consumer network refers to interdependencies
between consumers. In a consumer market there are
two levels of value attached to a product. ‘Autarky’
value (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990) refers to the
value associated with a product irrespective of the
number of other users. In marketing terms, this
would be the ‘core’ value of a product. In economics
this is the normal assumption and the theory of 
the firm is based on assumptions about the inde-
pendence of individual consumer preferences.
‘Synchronisation’ value is the augmented value
derived from being able to interact with other con-
sumers. The latter fuels the dynamics of network
effect discussed in McGee and Sammut-Bonnici
(2002). The relative abilities of Microsoft, Symbian
or other companies to capture synchronisation
value will determine who will win the race to estab-
lish the new operating system for third generation
mobile telephones. Customers will buy the 3G
phones with the operating system they expect to be
the most popular in the future. In this way they will
be able to communicate and exchange video clips
and photos with the widest possible set of users. The
success of the winning operating system will depend
on consumer choice, or it could depend on supply
chain strategies. For example, Microsoft and Intel
had cooperated to make Windows 95 exclusively
compatible with Intel x86 microprocessor architec-
tures and vice versa. The media coined the effect
the ‘Wintel advantage’. In the case of mobile oper-
ating systems, Symbian and Microsoft are rallying
their respective sets of supporters to establish sepa-
rate supply networks. 
Lock-in and switching costs
The Wintel case led to a situation of lock-in for
Windows users. The Wintel operating system
EUROPEAN BUSINESS JOURNAL 182
EBJ 14(4)_crc  2/12/02  2:13 PM  Page 182
quickly gained critical mass through rapid adoption
and it became the most popular system throughout
the world. Lock-in arises whenever users invest in
multiple complementary and durable assets specific
to a particular information technology system and
then find the costs of switching to alternatives to be
prohibitive. Thus Windows users invested in com-
plementary software such as the Microsoft Office
suite. Lock-in then occurred on an individual level,
company level and even a societal level. Thus indi-
viduals may face switching costs in adopting a rival
to Microsoft software, but so also do companies in
having to provide systematic retraining costs, and
so might whole communities in having to move
from one software product to another. The key is
that it would be necessary to switch from one dom-
inant product to another because of the
interdependencies and complementarities between
consumers. Private users were locked into the long-
playing record technology because records could
not be used on CD players (but were persuaded to
switch when the benefits of the new products
became sufficiently large). Note that the benefits of
tape recording were never large enough to persuade
customers to make a wholesale switch but the extra
benefits of tapes (ability to record) were sufficient
to persuade customers to invest in parallel systems.
Companies became locked into Lotus 1–2-3 spread-
sheets because their employees were trained in
using the program command structure. On a socie-
tal level, millions of users throughout the world are
locked into using Microsoft’s Windows desktop
operating environment, as it has become the stan-
dard software in offices around the world.
However, telecommunication systems providers
have had to switch to new, superior technologies
despite high switching costs. The industry has
undergone three generations of technologies,
TACS, ETACS and GSM, and is now in the early
days of introduction of 3G, incurring significant
investment costs. Switching becomes an exercise in
investing in strategic advantage based on expecta-
tions about the value of future benefits.
Switching costs and lock-in at the consumer
level are used as strategic tools to inhibit or, prefer-
ably, prevent consumers from adopting newer
technologies or moving to alternative networks.
Lock-in and switching costs in mobile communica-
tions are seen at the levels of service and
technology. Users may switch to another service by
going to a network provider with the same technol-
ogy, but with a different price structure. They may
choose to switch to another technology when they
replace their handsets with higher-level models.
The strategies of the mobile telecommunication
industry have focused on tangible and intangible
consumer costs when switching networks. In the
introductory phase customers were contractually
bound to a network for a year. They had to pay a
release fee to end the contract and a connection
charge to go to the next network. In the later 1990s
switching networks became easier with the intro-
duction of pay-as-you-go cards. The intangible cost
of switching remains irrespective of payment struc-
tures and Oftel’s recent pressure to minimise
switching cost in the industry. Customers resist the
investment in the time required to get used to a new
product and are further inhibited by the uncertain-
ty about the quality of untested product. The
influence of (psychological) brand loyalty remains
significant. To the consumer, a very relevant
switching cost is the loss of the mobile number
when moving to another network (this was also a
very big issue in the development of the telephone
system in the US over a century ago). The sub-
scriber’s reluctance to give up a number urged the
introduction of subsidised phones to attract a new
user, and more competitive tariffs. The power of
switching costs can be observed in the entry strate-
gies against powerful incumbents. Vodafone and
Cellnet, which started to operate in 1984, had a
captive customer base by the time Orange and
One2One entered the market in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. The new entrants had to generate new
customer-winning strategies with stronger branding
and lower costs. 
On a societal level economists observe that the
practice of using lock-in strategies can have nega-
tive welfare effects as new superior technologies are
suppressed. Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) discuss
the fascinating example of typewriter keyboard lay-
outs. In the 1870s the QWERTY configuration was
selected by the creators of the TypeWriter brand in
order to slow down typists to reduce jamming of the
keys. The Dvorak layout patented in 1932 is a more
efficient layout and allows faster typing. This would
suggest that QWERTY should then give way to the
more efficient keyboard layout. The phenomenon
of sticking to the slower QWERTY system is
explained in terms of switching costs. The collec-
tive switching costs are far higher than the
individual switching costs because the coordination
for mass switching to Dvorak is so difficult. With
the advent of electric typewriters if the 1950s and
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then computer keyboards the expectation is even
stronger but QWERTY still remains.
Expectations management
Rival firms in the network industry influence con-
sumers’ expectations in order to increase their
consumer base (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p. 219).
When competing to become market leaders in the
mobile communications industry, consumer expec-
tations were crucial. The mobile company that was
expected to grow the fastest would gain most mar-
ket share. The mobile industry has made consistent
use of semiotics in expectations management
through its media campaigns. In the early 1990s
images, music themes and slogans were used to
imply magnitude and leadership. Vodafone’s UK
corporate image campaign in its early days included
heavily symbolic images of the Thames Barrier and
the cliffs of Dover in the UK. Such symbols of
national interests were used to give the subliminal
message that Vodafone would succeed throughout
the UK. The musical theme in the Thames Barrier
campaign was from ‘Close Encounters’, implying
additional universal reach. The Cliffs of Dover
campaign involved the draping with material of a
large section of the cliffs, by a contemporary artist.
The message may have intended to address ‘cover-
age’ issues of radio transmission. Similarly, Orange
has had one of the most famous slogans in UK
media history: ‘The future is bright, the future is
Orange’. 
Summary and conclusion
The rate of growth and now the sheer size of the
ICT industry has been the progenitor of major
changes in the economy. We have seen major
effects on other industries through the new value
possibilities that information technology offers and
through the substantial fixed costs and minimum
scales required for effective deployment of these
technologies. When linked to networks of interde-
pendent customers we see the potential emergence
of ‘winner-takes-all’ strategies and the emergence of
new monopolies.
We have decomposed the ICT industry into its
component parts in order to see who the players are
and how they interact with one another. In doing
this we argue that we are beginning to see a new
type of industrial order – one marked by networked
complementarities and cooperation in place of the
traditional model of hierarchy and competition. We
have also decomposed the industry into four hori-
zontal levels, technology, supply chain, platform,
and network, to show that these have different eco-
nomic characteristics and therefore that corporate
strategies have different dynamics. The examples
quoted indicate the range and extent of the possi-
bilities inherent in the new technologies and the
nature of rivalry in the form of pre-emptive strikes
and technology races. We note particularly the per-
vasive changes that are taking place in supply
chains generally. The increasing importance of con-
nectivity and modularity is forcing a shift from
competitive mode towards cooperative mode. This
raises industry parallels with self-organising systems
and the notion of co-evolution, rather a long way
from the search for and exercise of crude bargaining
power. The sheer size and cost of physical platforms
also creates new dynamics. The pervasive use of
alliances is an obvious example. Less obvious is how
the need for interoperability requires new attitudes
towards complexity and requirements for agility in
the formulation and speed of implementation of the
strategies of firms. 
Finally we remark on the significance of interde-
pendence between consumers. This effect at its
strongest completely shifts our thinking from the
prevalence of oligopolistic competition (size mat-
ters but so do diminishing returns) to the possibility
of winner-takes-all and the power of monopoly (size
matters – full stop). Clearly such network effects are
not always going to be so extreme but there is a real
possibility that the combination of high fixed costs,
significant economies of scale, and high degrees of
knowledge specialisation will, when taken together
with consumer bandwagons, create massive new
corporate structures in which the major (and per-
haps only) discipline will be further developments
in technology. However, the analysis of consumer
lock-in suggests the real possibility that switching
costs might inhibit the adoption of valuable new
technologies.
Thus the brave new world has a sting in the tail.
The pervasive development of the ICT industries
has resulted in and continues to promote very sub-
stantial consequential changes throughout the
economy. In doing so, industry economics and
dynamics do change and significant adaptations
have to take place in making responses to avoid get-
ting run down by the juggernaut. But changes are
also needed in the nature of the corporate strategies
and in the mindsets required. Where the conjunc-
tion of certain technological and consumer
circumstances take place then the strategy game
becomes a very direct race to capture dominant
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position. Even where such games fail to achieve
their objectives, the cost of unproductive invest-
ment could be enormous. Where they in fact
succeed many others will nevertheless have failed
and we would also face the difficulties in managing
the consequences of de facto monopoly. The data
available do not suggest that winner-takes-all is
likely to be a frequent phenomenon. However, all
the other indications suggest that various forms of
scale-intensive, pre-emptive strategies will become
much more common (see, for example, the
telecommunications boom and bust). But as a coun-
terpoint we can also see that there are very
considerable forces promoting more cooperation
and stronger incentives towards a much more subtle
blending of cooperative and competitive modes of
practice within industries in the future.
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